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BOOK REVIEWS
THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY
By Jacques S. Gansler
The MIT Press, Cambridge. Mass., 1980. 346 pages.
ISBN 0-262-07 078-2
Reviewed by James E. Dalton *
In a recent appearance before a panel of the House Armed Services
Committee, Jacques Gansler opened his prepared statement with the
following comments:
The United States is the only nation in the world that does not treat its
defense industry as a critical national resource. In spite of the signifi-
cant level of defense expenditures during the last 25 years, the defense
industry has been allowed to deteriorate-particurly in the post-Viet-
nam era-so that now it is neither economically efficient in the produc-
tion of military goods nor capable of rapidly responding to strategic
demands for increased outputs. Only recently have people begun to
recognize this deterioration.
Gansler's testimony followed earlier appearances of leading industrial-
ists and four-star flag officers responsible for weapon-system acquisi-
tion. Their messages had a consistent thrust-the "arsenal of
democracy," which produced 5,000 aircraft of all types in the month of
April 1944, now produces less than 500 a year for our use, has jet en-
gine leadtimes of almost three-and-a-half years, has an inflation rate
for aerospace equipment well above twenty percent, and finds itself to-
tally dependent on foreign sources for some critical raw materials.
In a period when a consensus has developed regarding the need to
increase defense expenditures, sobering statements about the ability of
American industry to respond to these demands have created serious
doubts as to whether our "national resource" is in any condition to deal
effectively and efficiently with the challenge. There is little doubt that
the issues of defense requirements and America's ability to meet those
requirements will be key issues for Congress and the new administra-
tion.
Gansler's book provides an excellent framework to begin the dia-
logue which must inevitably take place regarding the health of our de-
fense industry. With a varied executive background in both industry
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and government spanning twenty-five years, he provides insights from
both perspectives and proposes solutions that should be of mutual in-
terest to both government and business. The book is well-organized
and well-researched, and the supporting tables and figures furnish ex-
cellent graphic support for the points presented in the text. Gansler
begins with a historical overview because many of the current problems
stem from the manner in which the industry has evolved. He moves
quickly, however, to narrow his focus to the post-Vietnam period and
provides an insight into the underlying economic factors and structure
of the industry, incuding its sectoral differences, its industrial mobiliza-
tion capability, and its subcontractor and supplier substructure. Explo-
ration of these areas establishes the basis for his later consideration of
other issues and leads to proposed solutions. Certain basic themes re-
garding the nature of the post-Vietnam defense industry appear in vari-
ous forms throughout the book and provide a sense of Gansler's
principal concerns.
The author wastes little time in destroying the argument that free-
market principles are operative in the defense arena. He argues that
because of this situation and the fact that some constraints to the free-
market operation cannot be removed, we should seek "second best"
solutions. This approach would require that policies not be designed to
create free-market conditions in an industry whose structure and oper-
ation militates against such policies; rather, policies should be tailored
for a specific sector of the defense industry.
Gansler highlights his view that the defense industry is not a single
industry, but rather a number of different industries, by contrasting the
aircraft industry and the shipbuilding industry. In the former, excess
capacity is the rule, with a significant portion of the production capac-
ity government-owned. In the latter, privately-owned shipyards suffer
from high labor turnover and inadequate capacity to meet expected
demands. Policy alternatives tailored specifically to the problems of
each industry are presented and serve to underscore differences and the
need for tailored policy treatment.
The shrinking second- and third-tier supplier base, where over half
of defense hardware dollars are spent, has begun to receive greater rec-
ognition in discussions of defense industry ills. Gansler's analysis de-
scribes the pressures which flow from a "winner-take-all" struggle at
the prime contractor level, featuring cost-plus-fee contracts to subcon-
tractors and suppliers faced with a prime contractor request for a fixed-
price contract. There is also a lingering concern on the part of suppli-
ers that the prime contractor will decide to manufacture the items him-
self. In this high risk environment with its relatively lower profit, it is
not surprising that attrition is high. Gansler emphasizes that the gov-
ernment must approach this "duel economy" separately in formulating
policies and regulations.
The author's treatment of weapons-system "cost" as the major de-
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sign criteria, in lieu of "performance," enables him to explore several
key points. Competition for weapons systems among contractors be-
gins with the development phase, where the expectation of meeting per-
formance goals establishes the basis for selection. Yet Gansler points
out that the lower cost development phase often leads to "sole sourc-
ing" in the production and support phases, where the large dollar costs
occur. Major contractors must, therefore, possess both research and de-
velopment (R&D) and production capability, and eventually absorb
major amounts of R&D funding. Gansler sees the need to separate
R&D from production, to compete on a cost basis for design and pro-
duction, and to provide R&D funding to smaller inventor-lead firms,
which have a higher probability of making technological break-
throughs.
An oft repeated theme of the testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee was the inability of the industrial base to respond
rapidly to demands for increased amounts of equipment, parts or sup-
plies. This essential aspect of defense has been slipping at an acceler-
ated rate. Gansler reviews the fundamental aspects of industrial
preparedness planning and its relationship to mobilization and belli-
cose demands; he concludes that current planning is "largely worth-
less." His recommendations in the area are extensive and among the
most detailed in the book.
Gansler examines other factors such as multinational considera-
tions, future trends, and foreign approaches to defense industry man-
agement, before proposing his solutions. His proposals deal with the
basic problems identified throughout the book. They are capped with a
call for institutionalized consideration of the industrial base by the gov-
ernment. This would reduce the overemphasis on policy formulation
and devote more attention to execution and evaluation. Gansler ac-
knowledges that his proposals in this area may take years to imple-
ment; however, they go to the heart of data collection and analysis,
management of facilities, regulatory objectives, macro versus micro
management, contracting approaches, combined procurements, and
lastly, the basic attitude of the Department of Defense.
Jacques Gansler's book is extremely informative and thought pro-
voking. It has the added benefit of arriving at a time when it is most
needed. The author's claim that three billion dollars a year could be
saved if current inefficiencies were corrected, should provide an irresis-
tible lure for those who make defense policy or authorize resources for
defense. Whether one fits either of those categories or not, The Defense
Industry should be required reading for all who hope to understand the
coming debate over the health of the "arsenal of democracy."
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DOUBLETALK: THE STORY OF SALT I
By Gerard Smith
Doubleday, Inc. & Co., Garden City, N.Y., 1980. 556 pages.
ISBN 0-385-11444-3
Reviewed by William 0. McLean*
It seemed inconceivable in the late 1960's that the world's two super
powers, whose ideologies were polarized, could voluntarily go to the
negotiating table and reach an agreement to limit their own strategic
nuclear arms. But as the 1970's approached, the state of world affairs
made it propitious to try to do just that, and a new acronym, SALT
(Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), entered the lexicon of international
relations. In November 1969 strategic arms limitations talks between
the United States and the Soviet Union were opened in Helsinki and
continued through seven negotiating sessions, for over two and one-
half years. These undertakings culminated in a summit meeting in
Moscow in May 1972 when President Nixon and Chairman Brezhnev
signed four nuclear arms limitations agreements. Five months later
their governments ratified these agreements which remain in effect to-
day.
Ambassador Gerard Smith served as the Chief American Negotia-
tor at SALT; Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I is his account of these
negotiations.
SALT I was a notable first step in a difficult effort to limit nuclear
armaments. Smith explains the four agreements, the most significant of
which was a treaty to stringently limit anti-ballistic missile deploy-
ments. The acceptance of this treaty amounted to the joint endorse-
ment of a mutually assured destruction strategy, a theory about which
there was considerable sparring in the early sessions of SALT I. Two
companion executive agreements were less publicized. The first agree-
ment delineated measures aimed at preventing an unwanted, escalating
nuclear exchange which could result from a nuclear accident or provo-
cation by a third country. The American delegation was somewhat sur-
prised at the priority given this subject by the Russian delegation. The
second executive agreement provided for technological upgrading of
the communications "hot-line" between the two countries. Upgrading
the "hot-line" was important because the superpowers could best avert
nuclear war by communicating rapidly on matters of uncertainty, and
the existing hot-line system utilizing radio links to terminals in third
countries was subject to disruption. All three of the agreements are of
* Captain, United States Navy (Retired); Assistant Dean and Associate Professor, Notre Dame
Law School; member, SALT I negotiating team. B.S., University of New Mexico, 1967;
M.S., George Washington University, 1969; M.A., University of Notre Dame, 1975.
Journal of Legislation
unlimited duration and have operated with little controversy in the in-
tervening decade. The fourth agreement called for a five-year freeze on
the number of land-and-sea-based strategic missile launchers that each
country currently had operating or under construction. Finally, SALT
I provided for a new round of negotiations (SALT II) to convert the
five-year freeze of offensive systems into a more permanent agreement
and possibly to make further limitations.
Ambassador Smith merits acclaim for two major contributions to
the objective of constraining nuclear weaponry: guiding SALT I to a
productive conclusion and recording in great detail the complex
processes that ultimately led to the accords. When the Nixon adminis-
tration took office in January 1969, the American mood was to con-
clude the Vietnam conflict, avoid further military confrontations, and
turn attention to social issues. Meanwhile the strategic weaponry of the
Soviet Union was growing toward parity with that of the United States,
with intelligence projections suggesting that Soviet production capaci-
ties could provide the Soviets with a situation of destabilizing nuclear
superiority. The alternatives perceived by the Nixon administration
were to accept a position of inferiority, to resume strategic nuclear
weapon production, or to negotiate limitations at levels of "suffi-
ciency." The last option was chosen, but many skeptics doubted the
wisdom of this decision to enter into what some called "'joint strategic
planning" with the Soviet Union.
President Nixon's choice of Gerard Smith to head the American
delegation helped defuse opposition to SALT. As a public servant of
every preceding administration since President Truman's, Smith had
established a reputation as one who could be trusted to protect our vital
national security interests in this new venture. The trust proved to be
well placed, as not once did Smith come under serious fire during ei-
ther the negotiations or the subsequent ratification process. A final
vote of confidence was reflected in the overwhelming endorsement of
the SALT I agreements by the United States Congress.
Eight years of negotiations produced the SALT II agreements
which have been the subject of so much current controversy in this
country. As a major issue in the recently concluded Presidential cam-
paign, former President Carter argued that the products of SALT II
should be ratified once the international furor over the Soviet Union's
move into Afghanistan had subsided. President Reagan argued during
the campaign that the SALT II accords were fatally flawed and should
be withdrawn from the congressional ratification process.
With Reagan as President, one can anticipate the demise of the
SALT II agreements. President Reagan foresees a SALT III, but only
after the United States has taken steps to rebuild its military strength.
Smith's detailed, and to the casual reader perhaps laborious, ac-
count of the pioneering efforts at controlling nuclear arms is indispen-
sable to the understanding of SALT II and further negotiations. The
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recent Presidential campaign evinces that the American public is con-
cerned about nuclear weapons, although it does not fully comprehend
the abstractions to which it is most often exposed, such as "multiple
independently-targetable reentry vehicles," "the mutual assured de-
struction strategy," and "the nuclear arms race." For the serious
reader, Smith sheds great light on these catch phrases and clothes them
in the political realities of such complex subjects.
The title, Doubletalk was probably chosen for marketing purposes,
and perhaps implies some exciting intrigue that led to the ultimate suc-
cess of the talks. Smith's account makes it clear that such was not the
case. SALT I proved that international negotiations of such great con-
sequence as to involve national security, when undertaken voluntarily,
are not won or lost through "one-upmanship." Success is achieved
through utmost good will, serious study, coordination at every level,
privacy in negotiations, and the perception by each side that what is
agreed upon is in its best interest. Mutual agreement occurs when con-
vergence of these perceptions takes place and only lasts as long as each
side continues to perceive that abiding by the accord is in its national
interest.
Nonetheless, there was "doubletalk" at various levels during SALT
I because of numerous maneuverings for position. The author outlines
the Washington process in which various vested interests operated to
influence the instructions to be given the American delegation. The
final instructions emanated from the President, following a National
Security Council meeting, in the form of a National Security Decision
Memorandum (NSDM). The domestic negotiations which preceded
the decision were often more fiery than those with the Russians. It can
be surmised that similar happenings were occurring in Moscow. Then
there was the doubletalk at the negotiating site. The Russians were
adept at talking endlessly, finding a different way to make the same
point without changing their position one iota, all the while awaiting
further instructions from Moscow. They undoubtedly drew the same
conclusion with regard to the Americans.
Closest to an element of intrigue was the occasion when President
Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger dealt directly
with Moscow to break deadlocks, without fully apprising Smith and the
American SALT delegation. This was the one facet of SALT I which
clearly disturbed the typically mild-mannered Smith. The author effec-
tively makes the point that matters of such import are not best resolved
secretly with only a few people involved; more properly the entire
American National Security leadership should openly scrutinize them.
For those who believe that nuclear arms should be limited, and the
SALT process is the means to pursue this goal, Ambassador Smith's
account of SALT I should serve as a foremost reference work for years
to come.
1981]
